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ROGUE DEBTORS AND UNANTICIPATED RISK
S.I. STRONG*
International investment always carries a certain amount of
risk. However, the current economic climate is particularly
challenging as a result of various states’ aggressive and often nontraditional investment policies1 as well as an increase in political
instability in several regions.2
Although investors are routinely required to calculate financial
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1 See Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation
of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State-Owned Enterprises, and the Chinese Experience, 19
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 11-13 (2010) (describing how sovereign
wealth funds have become more aggressive in their “scope and form” over the
last decade); Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulatory Chameleons:
The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Global Governance Through Private
Global Investment, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 425, 425-30 (2010) (arguing that states have
become increasingly dependent on direct foreign investment); Clement N.
Fondufe & Sara Mansuri, Doing Deals in Africa – Reflections on What is Different and
What is Not, 14 BUS. L. INT’L 163, 173 (2013) (noting that in Africa “there is an
uptick in the volume of capital markets work in the form of private and public
offerings to raise funds for different investments”); David B. Wilkins & Mihaela
Papa, The Rise of the Corporate Legal Elite in the BRICS: Implications for Good
Governance, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1149, 1150 (2013) (discussing investment patterns in
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).
2 See Sophie Brown, Report: Political Instability on the Rise, CNN.com (Dec. 12,
2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/11/business/maplecroft-political-risk/;
see also MAPLECROFT, POLITICAL RISK ANALYSIS (2013), available at
http://maplecroft.com/about/news/pra_2013.html (noting “extreme risk” of
resource nationalism and expropriation in twenty-one nations); MULTILATERAL
INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY (MIGA), WORLD BANK GRP., 2012 WORLD
INVESTMENT AND POLITICAL RISK 29 (2012) [hereinafter MIGA], available at
http://www.miga.org/documents/WIPR12.pdf (discussing how and when
countries become crisis-prone).
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risks,3 “political risk events are not easily predictable.”4 In
particular, it is extremely difficult to anticipate whether a
particular nation will become a so-called “rogue debtor,” meaning
a state that “take[s] purposeful advantage of [its] de facto
immunity to walk away from legal and financial obligations.”5
The concept of sovereign default is not new.6 However, the
possibility of rogue debtors presents problems for both individual
investors7 and “the integrity and efficiency of international capital
markets” as a whole.8 One primary concern involves questions
about how creditors can recoup or protect against losses in cases of
sovereign default.9
Traditionally, states, markets and investors have attempted to
3
See, e.g., Karen Halverson Cross, Sovereign Arbitration, in SOVEREIGN DEBT
MANAGEMENT ¶¶ 12.31, 12.43 (Rosa Lastra & Lee Buchheit eds., forthcoming 2014).
4 MIGA, supra note 2, at 42.
5 Arturo C. Porzecanski, From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of
Argentina’s Default, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 311, 316 (2005). See also MIGA, supra note 2, at
33 (“Although defaults and expropriations rarely coincide in the same year, they
are historically related in the sense that the same types of countries seem to
engage in both over the long term.”).
6
See Faisal Z. Ahmed et al., Lawsuits and Empire: On the Enforcement of
Sovereign Debt in Latin America, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 39 (2010) (discussing
the history of sovereign default); Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, The Pari Passu
Interpretation in the Elliott Case: Brilliant Strategy But An Awful (Mid-Long Term)
Outcome?, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 39, 56-58 (2011) (detailing the history of sovereign
default in Latin America starting with Peru in 1985); Porzecanski, supra note 5, at
316, 325 (discussing Argentina’s “unparalleled” history of sovereign default).
7
See Stephen J. Choi et al., The Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign
Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131, 131-32 (2012) (“From the perspective of outside
investors, distinguishing a good from bad state can be difficult.”); Anna Gelpern,
A Skeptic’s Case for Sovereign Bankruptcy, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1095, 1118 (2013) (noting
that certain members of the creditor community framed some of Greece’s
legislative efforts to address sovereign debt restructuring as “lawless” in nature);
Olivares-Caminal, supra note 6, at 63 (discussing the risk associated with
including a pari passu clause in a bond).
8
Porzecanski, supra note 5, at 316. To some extent, advanced economies
may be at a higher risk for sovereign default than rising nations, although
sovereign default is often analyzed in conjunction with the risk of expropriation,
which is traditionally associated with rising nations. See MIGA, supra note 2, at
39.
9
See MIGA, supra note 2, at 39 (“As the emerging economies have relied
more on FDI as a substantial source of foreign currency in recent years,
expropriation risk seems to be relatively higher.”); Cross, supra note 3, ¶¶ 12.2912.51, tbl. 12.1 (discussing sovereign default in the context of Abaclat v. Argentine
Republic); Fondufe & Mansuri, supra note 1, at 165 (arguing that “we are
witnessing a rush by foreign investors to bid for opportunities in the most
lucrative industries” in Africa); Olivares-Caminal, supra note 6, at 60-63
(discussing sovereign default in Argentina).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/9

09_STRONG (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

10/13/2014 11:10 AM

ROGUE DEBTORS AND UNANTICIPATED RISKS

1141

manage risk through regulation, insurance and private contract.10
However, conventional forms of regulation are problematic in the
international context because of the absence of single political actor
that can address wrongful behavior and associated legal injuries in
Contract and insurance-based
a comprehensive manner.11
remedies can be difficult or expensive to obtain because sovereign
default tends to be associated with “idiosyncratic economic
shocks” that are difficult to predict.12 All of these approaches also
tend to be limited to cases where the possibility of sovereign
default has been anticipated in advance.13
However, there are other ways to address sovereign default.14
One mechanism, known as “regulatory litigation,” may be
particularly useful, since it focuses on unanticipated risk.15
According to theorists, regulatory litigation allows both public and
private actors to fill certain gaps in the relevant regulatory regime
by using a “legal remedy or the settlement equivalent in order to
influence future, risk-producing behaviors.”16 Although this
device has been successful in cases involving corporate

10
See MIGA, supra note 2, at 37, 42 (discussing risk aversion in emerging
economies); Iman Anabtawi & Stephen L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law
Can Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 91 (2013)
(discussing mitigation of risk in the financial context); Choi et al., supra note 7, at
132 (discussing risk management in sovereign debt investments); OlivaresCaminal, supra note 6, at 46-49, 62-63 (discussing use of pari passu clauses).
11
See Cross, supra note 3, ¶¶ 12.52-12.56 (detailing the problems with
establishing a single tribunal for investment claims); Richard A. Nagareda,
Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62
VAND. L. REV. 1, 13 (2009) (“[N]o formal political state has authority of a scope
commensurate with modern global business. As a result, our world is one that
virtually invites regulatory mismatches.”).
12
MIGA, supra note 2, at 35 (citing Maya Eden et al., Sovereign Defaults and
Expropriations: Empirical Regularities (The World Bank, Policy Research Working
Paper No. 6218, 2012)).
13 Some observers might suggest that Argentina should have fallen into that
category. See EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463, 466 n.2 (2d Cir.
2007) (recounting the history of Argentinian financial difficulties). However, as
the recent financial crisis shows, sometimes the signs of risk exist but are ignored
until it is too late. See Steve Charnovitz, Addressing Government Failure Through
International Financial Law, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 743, 748 (2010).
14
See Ahmed et al., supra note 6, at 40 (suggesting the use of sanctions,
including litigation as a sanction).
15
See Patrick Luff, Risk Regulation and Regulatory Litigation, 64 RUTGERS L.
REV. 73, 113 (2011).
16
See id.; see also John S. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking
Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 344-45 (2010).
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defendants,17 it has been largely ineffective in situations involving
rogue debtors because of problems relating to the legal immunity
of sovereigns and their assets.18 As a result, some commentators
have suggested that interstate negotiation constitutes the best if not
only realistic means of addressing unanticipated sovereign
defaults.19
However, another alternative may exist. In the last few years,
investors have been experimenting with the possibility of using
investment arbitration to address defaults on sovereign bonds.20
Although there is still some debate about whether sovereign debt
qualifies as an “investment” under various international treaties,21
investment arbitration avoids a number of problems associated
with regulatory litigation while nevertheless retaining some of its
benefits.
For example, states in investment arbitration are
considered to have waived their immunity to suit.22 Furthermore,
enforcement of awards arising out of investment arbitration is
typically easier than enforcement of judgments arising out of
national courts.23
If investment arbitration is accepted as a regulatory mechanism
similar to regulatory litigation, then investors may have found a
workable solution to the problem of sovereign default.24 However,
17 See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 119 (2000) (“[M]any corporate representatives whom we
interviewed said that the burst of new class litigation has caused them to review
financial and employment practices.”).
18
See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Responsible Sovereign Lending and
Borrowing, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 73 (2010) (suggesting that laws relating
to sovereign immunity prohibit the seizure of state property to satisfy a
judgment); Cross, supra note 3, ¶¶ 12.05, 12.19; Gelpern, supra note 7, at 1097.
19 See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 18, at 69.
20 See id. at 86; Cross, supra note 3, ¶¶ 12.33-12.51.
21 See Cross, supra note 3, ¶¶ 12.28-12.44.
22
See id. ¶ 12.05; Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in
International Arbitration, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 711, 715 (2007).
23 See Cross, supra note 3, ¶ 12.05.
24
Although most commentators agree that international investment law
operates as a regulatory mechanism, much of the analysis focuses on substantive
issues, since that approach mimics conventional thinking regarding legislatively
enacted regulation. See Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan W. Schill, Investor-State
Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the
Emerging Global Administrative Law, in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 5,
10 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2008); Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International
Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New
Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 57, 80-81, 85 (2011); Gus Van Harten &
Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative
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regulatory litigation and arbitration are meant to operate as flexible
responses to unforeseen events, and it is unclear how much
flexibility is allowed in investment arbitration as either a
procedural or substantive matter.25
This sort of philosophical split was evident in the preliminary
award on jurisdiction rendered by the arbitral tribunal in Abaclat v.
Argentine Republic, the first investment proceeding to address a
default on sovereign bonds.26 According to the claimants, “[t]he
major threat to the efficiency of foreign debt restructuring [is]
rogue debtors . . . . Consequently, opening the door to ICSID
arbitration would create a supplementary leverage against such
rogue debtors and therefore be beneficial to the efficiency of
foreign debt restructuring.”27 The majority agreed that there was a
“need for certain adaptations to the standard ICSID arbitration
procedure,” based on “the impossibility to anticipate all kinds of
possible investments and disputes,” and therefore allowed the
dispute to move forward to the merits phase.28 The Abaclat
Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 124-27, 148 (2006). However, the question here is
whether a particular process, in this case investment arbitration, might also act in
a regulatory manner. See S.I. Strong, Mass Procedures as a Form of “Regulatory
Arbitration” – Abaclat v. Argentine Republic and the International Investment
Regime, 38 J. CORP. L. 259, 265 (2013) [hereinafter Strong, Regulatory Arbitration].
This analysis is facilitated by the fact that contemporary commentators have
expanded the definition of regulation to include regulatory activity undertaken by
private actors and other decentralized entities. See Colin Scott, Privatization and
Regulatory Regimes, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY 651, 653 (Michael
Moran et al. eds., 2006).
25 Compare José E. Alvarez, A BIT on Custom, 2 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 17, 44
(2009) (suggesting need for flexibility in treaty interpretation), with Leon E.
Trakman, Foreign Direct Investment: Hazard or Opportunity? 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L.
REV. 1, 3 (2009) (suggesting need for predictability in treaty interpretation). See
also Daniella Strik, Investment Protection of Sovereign Debt and its Implications on the
Future of Investment Law in the EU, 29 J. INT’L ARB. 183, 189-90 (2012) (discussing
possible precedential power of Abaclat v. Argentine Republic); Strong, Regulatory
Arbitration, supra note 24, at 313-16 (discussing procedural and substantive
uncertainty).
26
See Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2011) [hereinafter
Abaclat
Award],
available
at
http://italaw.com/documents/AbaclatDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf;
Abaclat
(formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Dissenting Opinion (Oct. 28, 2011) [hereinafter
Abaclat
Dissent],
available
at
http://italaw.com/documents/Abaclat_Dissenting_Opinion.pdf.
27 Abaclat Award, supra note 26, ¶ 514.
28 Id. ¶ 519.
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approach has subsequently been adopted, at least to a limited
extent, by other arbitral tribunals facing defaults on sovereign
bonds.29
The dissent in Abaclat strongly opposed any efforts “to create . .
. leverage over sovereign debtors” through the use of “the
tribunal’s gap-filling powers under article 44 of the ICSID
Convention,” since neither the ICSID Convention nor the financial
markets had ever contemplated such an approach.30 The dissent
also
caution[ed] against the tendency of certain ICSID tribunals
to consider any limitation on their jurisdiction . . . as an
obstacle in the way of achieving the object and purpose of
these treaties, which they interpret as being exclusively to
afford maximum protection to investment, notwithstanding
the legitimate interests of the host State.31
The dissent’s concerns about the propriety of investment
arbitration were not limited to a philosophical dispute about the
flexibility of investment arbitration. The dissent also had a very
practical problem in mind, namely the possibility that an expansive
approach to investment arbitration in this context would trigger a
more general backlash against investment arbitration.32
Concerns about a growing disenchantment with investment
arbitration are not new. As state respondents have come to realize
that investment arbitration constitutes a regulatory mechanism
with real teeth,33 some states have either withdrawn from or
refused to enter into various investment treaties.34 However, this
29
See Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/9, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶¶ 12, 423 (Feb. 8, 2013),
available
at
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw1276.pdf; Cross, supra note 3, ¶¶ 12.28-12.32.
30 Abaclat Dissent, supra note 26, ¶ 265.
31 Id. ¶ 272.
32 See id.¶ 274.
33 See Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J.
775, 843-44 (2012) (emphasizing investment arbitration’s increasingly significant
role in the resolution of international disputes).
34
See id. at 843-44; Luke Eric Peterson, In Policy Switch, Australia Disavows
Need for Investor-State Arbitration Provisions in Trade and Investment Agreements,
INVESTMENT
ARB.
REP.
(Apr.
14,
2012),
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20110414; Sergey Ripinsky, Venezuela’s
Withdrawal from ICSID: What it Does and Does Not Achieve, INVESTMENT TREATY
NEWS (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/venezuelaswithdrawal-from-icsid-what-it-does-and-does-not-achieve/.
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approach is both relatively extreme and relatively rare. Instead,
the real threat to the investment regime comes from more nuanced
responses to the risk of broad financial exposure in investment
arbitration.
At this point, states appear to have devised three possible ways
of minimizing the likelihood of being named as a respondent in an
arbitral proceeding involving sovereign debt. First, states may
specifically exclude disputes involving sovereign debt from the
scope of existing treaties or subject such matters to special
treatment.35 A number of these clauses already exist, although no
tribunal has yet addressed one of these provisions.36
Analytically, this approach could generate a number of
challenges. On the one hand, states are entitled to limit the scope
of the treaties into which they enter. However, difficulties could
arise if the exclusions conflicted with other principles of
international law.37 Practical and jurisprudential problems could
also arise if the state in question was seeking to amend the terms of
an existing treaty, since it is often difficult to alter international
agreements once they are in force.38
Second, states could specifically exclude certain types of
remedies, such as investment arbitration, from contracts associated
with sovereign debt.39 The need for an express waiver may seem
anomalous, since arbitration is a creature of consent and most
sovereign loan agreements do not currently include an arbitration
provision.40 However, investment arbitration involves a “standing
offer” of arbitration from the state to all eligible investors pursuant
to a bilateral or multilateral investment treaty or free trade
agreement, which means that a qualified party can bring an
investment proceeding even if the underlying contract does not

See Cross, supra note 3, ¶¶ 12.45-12.51.
See id. ¶¶ 12.45-12.51, tbl. 12.1.
37
See id. ¶¶ 12.45-12.51; S.I. Strong, Limits of Autonomy in International
Investment Arbitration: Are Contractual Waivers of Mass Procedures Enforceable? in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE
FORDHAM PAPERS 2013 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter
Strong, Waiver] (discussing how waivers of investment arbitration might be
treated under international law).
38 See Strong, Waiver, supra note 37.
39
See id. (discussing three ways states could attempt to limit liability in
investment arbitration).
40 See Cross, supra note 3, ¶ 12.02.
35
36
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include an arbitration provision.41
It is unknown whether any state has attempted to insert a
waiver of investment arbitration in a sovereign loan agreement.
However, an explicit waiver of investment arbitration was recently
proposed by the Republic of Colombia in a model concession
agreement,42 which suggests that similar language could be used in
other contexts, including sovereign debt.
No arbitral tribunal has yet considered the validity of a
contractual waiver of investment arbitration, and very little
commentary exists regarding the enforceability of such
provisions.43 However, observers believe that these waivers would
be extremely problematic, since states would be allowed “to reap
the general benefits of signing investment treaties (in terms of
reciprocity and reputation) without having to face up to the
regulation and potential scrutiny that such treaties entail.”44
Finally, states could include contractual restructuring clauses
known as collective action clauses (CACs) in sovereign bonds so as
to limit the possibility of holdout creditors bringing an investment
action.45 Although no tribunal has yet been asked to consider these
sorts of provisions in the context of sovereign debt, some states
have already adopted these sorts of provisions as a precautionary
measure.46

See id. ¶ 12.08, 12.15; Strong, Waiver, supra note 37.
The language was subsequently removed following objection from the
international community. See Sebastian Perry, Colombia Drops Treaty Claim Waiver
Provision,
GLOBAL
ARB.
REV.
(Dec.
13,
2013),
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/32122/colombia-drops-treatyclaim-waiver-provision/; S.I. Strong, Contractual Waivers of Investment Arbitration:
Wa(i)ve of the Future? 29 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. (forthcoming 2014)
[hereinafter Strong, Contractual Waivers] (on file with author).
43 See Paul Michael Blyschak, State Consent, Investor Interests and the Future of
Investment Arbitration: Reanalyzing the Jurisdiction of Investor-State Tribunals in Hard
Cases, 9 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 99, 127 (2009) (discussing paucity of
authority relating to waiver); Ole Spiermann, Individual Rights, State Interests and
the Power to Waive ICSID Jurisdiction Under Bilateral Investment Treaties, 20 ARB.
INT’L 179, 183 (2004) (discussing the concept of waiver of investment arbitration);
Strong, Contractual Waivers, supra note 42 (analyzing issues relating to waiver of
investment arbitration); Strong, Waiver, supra note 37 (discussing waiver in the
context of class or mass claims).
44 Blyschak, supra note 43, at 148 (citation omitted).
45 See Waibel, supra note 22, at 713, 735-38.
46
See Cross, supra note 3, ¶ 12.33 (discussing a Greek law that retroactively
inserted collective-action clauses into Greek sovereign debt instruments that could
effectively bar sovereign debt claims of the type seen in Abaclat).
41
42
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As the preceding suggests, questions relating to sovereign debt
are extremely complicated, and it is impossible to address all
relevant issues in an Essay of this magnitude. However, it is clear
that the international legal community has much to consider in the
coming years. Not only will tribunals have to parse through the
precise language of the relevant treaties and contracts, they may
also need to consider important policy issues such as who should
bear the burden of the risk of loss.47 On the one hand, many
investors are relatively sophisticated and should perhaps be
considered to be on notice of the possibility of rogue debtors.48
Certainly the recent trend toward including sovereign default as an
insurable political risk suggests that sovereign insolvency should
no longer be considered an unanticipated event.49 On the other
hand, sovereign default remains a largely random occurrence, and
may not possible for investors or insurers to protect themselves
properly against such scenarios. Furthermore, it may not be just or
economically prudent to allow states to act in bad faith, given the
effect such behavior has on global capital markets.50
When considering these issues, it may be useful to consider
research on regulatory litigation that discusses who is best placed
to guard against particular sorts of risks.51 Although such analyses
are beyond the scope of the current Essay, they would likely shed a
great deal of light on what is an extremely important issue in
international legal and business circles.52

See Abaclat Dissent, supra note 26, ¶ 270.
See Abaclat Award, supra note 26, ¶ 461.
49 See MIGA, supra note 2, at 46-47 (discussing empirical evidence concerning
political risk calculation).
50
See Blyschak, supra note 43, at 148 (discussing effect of sovereign default
on international investment).
51
See S.I. Strong, Regulatory Litigation in the European Union: Does the U.S.
Class Action Have a New Analogue?, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 899, 948-53 (2012)
(considering how regulatory litigation operates in different regions).
52
See Waibel, supra note 22, at 757-89 (noting the importance of sovereign
default issues to global economy).
47
48
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